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ABSTRACT 
Research on the activation of negated concepts has demonstrated situations in which negated 
concepts are less active than non-negated concepts (e.g., MacDonald & Just, 1989) as well as 
situations where negated and non-negated concepts are equally active (e.g., Autry & Levine, 
2012, in press). Based on the pragmatic inference hypothesis (Levine & Hagaman, 2008), the 
present experiments tested the hypothesis that the activation level of negated concepts is a 
function of the context in which they occur. In two experiments, the activation level of target 
concepts was measured following licensing or non-licensing contexts using lexical decision and 
reading times. Although Experiment 1 suggested that subjects inferred the target concept in the 
licensing contexts more than in the non-licensing contexts, Experiment 2 did not find the 
predicted evidence of a differential negation effect in licensing and non-licensing contexts. These 
findings suggest that licensing does not affect the activation of negated concepts. 
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Effects of Licensed and Unlicensed Negation on the Activation of Negated Concepts 
Language comprehension and production are vital cognitive abilities that are involved in 
nearly every aspect of life. Language allows for the transmission of thought, not only from one 
person directly to another, but also across space and time. A single thought can travel across the 
world and persist for thousands of years when transformed from the momentary firing of neurons 
into a known language, spreading from one mind to the next. But how is it that a person can 
understand the meaning packaged within a pattern of sounds or images? 
Research on the processing of language has suggested that comprehending an utterance 
involves the construction of multiple mental representations (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kintsch & 
van Dijk, 1978; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). The verbatim 
representation consists of the specific spoken or written words that comprised the utterance, and 
the propositional representation consists of the individual propositions that give meaning to the 
utterance. For example, the statement “The young fisherman caught a swordfish” would be 
divided into simple propositions (e.g., there was a fisherman, the fisherman was young, there 
was a swordfish, and the fisherman obtained the swordfish) and the sentence could be recalled 
word-for-word by referencing the verbatim representation or its gist could be recalled by 
reconstruction of the propositions (e.g., "A swordfish was caught by a fisherman who was 
young.").  
The most complex representation, however, is the situational representation, or situation 
model, which consists of the state of affairs described by the utterance. The situation model 
integrates the propositional representation with general world knowledge to add additional 
inferred meaning not explicitly provided by an utterance (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kintsch & van 
Dijk, 1978; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). For the previous example, 
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the situation model might include information about the event occurring in the ocean, on a boat, 
during the day time, and that the fisherman was using a fishing rod rather than a net, or a spear-
gun, or his hands. None of this information is actually transmitted by the utterance, but the 
comprehender may assume many details based on their world knowledge (e.g., swordfish are 
saltwater fish). 
Within a given discourse (e.g., a conversation, article, novel, etc.), the comprehender 
must continually update and attempt to maintain a coherent situation model, or set of situation 
models (Kaup, Lüdtke, & Zwaan, 2007). Memory and attention are limited resources, so as the 
topic of a discourse shifts, so too does the accessibility or activation of the various elements 
within the representation. Focused concepts become more highly activated, while older or less 
relevant concepts become less active (Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987). Maintaining the 
appropriate activation levels for concepts is essential for determining how new information fits 
into the situation model. 
Negation (e.g., no, not) poses an interesting problem for the construction of these 
situation models; specifically, how do we represent a concept that has been negated (e.g., the car 
in Joe has no car)? The concept could be present in the representation, as if the negation had not 
occurred, but this is unlikely if we assume that negation serves a purpose (e.g., Giora, Balaban, 
Fein, & Alkabetz, 2005; Giora, Fein, Metuki, & Stern, 2010; Greene, 1970). The meaning of Joe 
has a car and Joe has no car are clearly different, and the situation model should somehow 
reflect that difference. Alternatively, the concept could be completely absent from the 
representation as if it had not been mentioned. However, there is evidence that negated concepts 
can be referred to anaphorically (e.g., Joe has no car. It was totaled last week), suggesting that 
the negated concept is at least somewhat active and available for referential purposes (Cook, 
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Myers, & O’Brien, 2005; Levine & Hagaman, 2008; Shuval & Hemforth, 2008). Therefore, the 
most likely explanation is that negated concepts are present in the representation but somehow 
marked as having been negated. What then is the effect of signaling a concept as negated? For 
the purposes of the present experiments, I will be focusing on the negation of entities (i.e., 
nouns) rather than properties or actions. Properties, in particular, may be processed quite 
differently from entities because they often have a clear opposite (e.g., not dirty = clean) whereas 
entities typically do not.  
Research on the activation level of negated concepts has repeatedly produced two 
seemingly incompatible results. Some studies have shown that the mental representations of 
negated concepts are less active than non-negated concepts (e.g., MacDonald & Just, 1989), 
suggesting that negation reduces activation. However, more recent studies have found that 
negated concepts are represented at roughly the same level of activation as non-negated concepts 
(e.g., Autry & Levine, 2012, in press), suggesting that negation does not reduce activation. In 
this paper, I provide a brief review of these studies, followed by a theoretical explanation for 
why these discrepant results may have emerged, and an empirical test of context’s role in the 
effect of negation on the activation levels of concepts.  
The traditional view of negation as a linguistic operator that reduces the mental activation 
of a concept (Greene, 1970; Johnson-Laird & Tridgell, 1972), referred to here as the reduced 
activation view, is supported by a number of studies that measured the activation level of negated 
concepts following sentences containing a negation. In an early study (MacDonald & Just, 1989), 
subjects read sentences with or without a negated concept (e.g., Elizabeth baked bread and 
cookies for the children; Elizabeth baked bread but no cookies for the children) followed 
immediately by a probe (e.g., cookies) naming or recognition task. On both measures, a negation 
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effect emerged: subjects were slower to respond to concepts when they had been negated 
compared to when they had been non-negated, supporting the reduced activation view. In a 
similar study (Kaup, 2001), subjects read multi-sentence passages in which the penultimate 
sentence included a negation (e.g., Sarah is now building a chair but not a table for her uncle1). 
Each passage was followed by a probe recognition task 2500 ms after the final sentence. 
Consistent with the reduced activation view, response times were longer for negated concepts 
than for non-negated concepts. Furthermore, the presence of a negation effect after such a delay 
suggests that the reduced activation persists across time.  
Cook et al. (2005) found evidence for a negation effect after an even longer delay. In this 
study, the negation (e.g., Terry knew she could not afford to buy the cello) occurred near the 
middle of an approximately 15-sentence passage. Reading time was measured on the final 
sentence, which included an anaphoric reference to the target concept (e.g., Jill asked what 
instrument she bought). Subjects also completed probe recognition and naming tasks 500 ms 
after the end of the passages. Two important results emerged from this design. First, subjects 
read the final sentence slower when the target concept had been negated than when it had been 
non-negated. This effect is presumably the result of increased difficulty resolving the anaphor in 
the negated condition, suggesting that the antecedent (i.e., the negated concept) was less active.2 
Second, subjects responded to recognition and naming probes more slowly when the concept was 
negated, providing more direct evidence that the negated concepts were less active than non-
                                                          
1 This is translated from the original German. 
2 However, this finding also suggests that the negated concepts were considered during anaphor 
resolution. So although the activation level of concepts appears to be reduced by negation, it 
does not completely eliminate the concept from the subjects’ mental representations.  
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negated concepts. The increased distance between the negation and the measurement of the 
concepts’ activation provides even stronger evidence that the negated concepts maintain their 
reduced level of activation.  
 Further evidence in support of the reduced activation view was provided by Hasson and 
Glucksberg (2006), who had subjects read positive and negative metaphors (e.g., The train to 
Boston was a/no rocket) along with neutral metaphors that served as a control. The metaphors 
were followed by a lexical decision task that presented the affirmative meaning of the metaphor's 
vehicle (e.g., fast) or the negative meaning of the vehicle (e.g., slow) either 150, 500, or 1000 ms 
after the end of the sentence. The comparison of most interest here is the reaction times to the 
affirmative meaning following the negative metaphors at the three delays; in this case, the probe 
word is consistent with the counterfactual meaning of the metaphor rather than the intended 
meaning of the metaphor. Responses to the affirmative meaning of the metaphor (e.g., fast) were 
facilitated relative to the neutral metaphor following the negative metaphor at the early delays of 
150 and 500 ms; however, at the 1000 ms delay, the affirmative meaning was no longer 
facilitated. Consistent with MacDonald and Just (1989), Kaup (2001), and Cook et al. (2005), 
this result suggests that the affirmative meaning of a negated concept will eventually be reduced 
in activation. Although the reduction was not immediate in this study, it is possible that the 
processing of metaphors may take more time than the processing of literal expressions due to the 
need to process both the literal and non-literal meaning of the metaphor (Giora, 1997).  
 Despite the many studies which show evidence of negated concepts being less active than 
non-negated concepts, there are a few studies which provide evidence of equally active negated 
concepts, referred to here as the equal activation view. For example, Giora, Fein, Aschkenazi, 
and Alkabets-Zlozover (2007) modified Hasson and Glucksberg’s (2006) materials by adding a 
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context sentence after the metaphor. These contexts were either coherent, meaning they stayed 
on the same topic as the metaphor (e.g., The train to Boston was no rocket. The trip to the city 
was fast though), or incoherent, meaning they shifted to a new topic (e.g., The train to Boston 
was no rocket. The old man in the film spoke fast though). Subjects’ reading times were recorded 
on the target concept (e.g., the word fast in the late context). Inconsistent with the reduced 
activation view, subjects read the target concept faster in the coherent strings than in the 
incoherent strings, suggesting that when the late context made the previously presented material 
remain relevant, the concepts maintained their activation regardless of negation. However, this 
finding should be interpreted with caution because incoherence likely affects reading time 
independent of the relevance of the target word.  
 Stronger support for the equal activation view was provided by Levine and Hagaman 
(2008). In this study, subjects read short passages that introduced a negated and non-negated 
concept from the same taxonomic category (e.g., Justin bought a mango but not a pineapple). 
The negation sentence either appeared on its own (i.e., the no reference condition) or was 
followed by an anaphor sentence (i.e., the reference condition) which referred to the non-negated 
concept using a categorical anaphor (e.g., He ate the fruit). After reading all of the passages, 
subjects were given a surprise cued-recall task (e.g., “You read about two kinds of FRUIT – 
what was one of them?” followed by “You read about two kinds of FRUIT – what was the 
other?”). Within the no reference condition, subjects recalled negated and non-negated concepts 
equally often, providing no evidence that negated concepts were less active. More importantly, 
negated concepts in the reference condition were recalled significantly more often than non-
referenced, non-negated concepts. The finding that negated concepts increased in activation even 
when the reference was to the non-negated concept suggests that the negated concepts were 
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being considered during anaphor resolution. These results not only demonstrate a situation where 
negated concepts have an advantage over non-negated concepts, they also show that negated 
concepts must be maintaining some degree of activation in order to be considered as a possible 
antecedent.  
 Additional evidence that negated concepts are considered during anaphor resolution was 
presented by Shuval and Hemforth (2008). In this study, subjects read sentence pairs in which 
the first sentence introduced a negated and a non-negated concept (e.g., You’re going to buy a 
motorcycle, not a convertible, this year before summer) and the second sentence unambiguously3 
referred to either the negated concept (e.g., It can be rented during the vacation) or the non-
negated concept (e.g., It can be driven during the vacation). There were no differences in reading 
times on the second sentence regardless of whether it was referring to the negated or non-negated 
concept, suggesting that both concepts were equally active and available as antecedents for the 
pronoun.  
 The studies reviewed here demonstrate the inconsistent results obtained in studies of the 
mental representation of negated concepts. Recent work, however, has provided a possible 
explanation for the different patterns of activation for negated concepts by taking into account 
the context of the negation, specifically whether the discourse licenses the use of negation, a 
notion discussed in more detail below. 
 A common use of negation is to cancel or deny an existing presupposition (i.e., an 
implicit assumption or background belief). For example, the statement “Michael no longer 
drives” presupposes that Michael once drove. Encountering negation therefore initiates a process 
                                                          
3 The materials in Shuval and Hemforth (2008) were presented in French and the two concepts 
were always of different grammatical gender. Therefore the pronoun “It” in the second sentence 
was unambiguous because of its gender marking. 
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to select a relevant presupposition to deny. According to the pragmatic-inference hypothesis 
(Levine & Hagaman, 2008), the degree to which a relevant presupposition is available in the 
discourse or general world knowledge will affect the relative difficulty of processing a negation. 
In the case of licensed negation, when a relevant presupposition is highly available, the 
necessary processing should be relatively easy (i.e., the presupposition may be explicitly 
mentioned in the prior discourse or may require a simple inference). However, in the case of 
unlicensed negation, when a relevant presupposition is not readily available, additional 
processing is necessary to generate a presupposition that would justify the use of the negation, 
making the overall processing and integration into the situation model more difficult. 
 For example, in the context of choosing players for a basketball team, the statement 
Richard is not tall is relevant because height is well-known to be an important component of 
playing ability. The comprehender should be able to quickly and easily relate this statement to 
the presupposition that good basketball players are usually tall. But in the same context of 
choosing players for a basketball team, the statement Richard is not rich would be relatively 
more difficult to comprehend. The comprehender would have to engage in some additional 
processing to determine the statement’s relevance to the discourse, for example, that a wealthy 
player might be able to spend more time practicing or would have access to better equipment. 
Outside of any context, both Richard is not tall and Richard is not rich would be even more 
difficult. Without an identifiable reason for the negation, the comprehender is left with an infinite 
number of possible presuppositions being denied and no information aside from probability to 
guide the selection of the correct one. 
 Another way of conceptualizing this difference in difficulty relies on the concept of 
questions under discussion (i.e., QUDs), an approach which views discourse as a series of 
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questions and answers (Clifton & Frazier, 2012; Roberts, 2004). These questions may be raised 
either explicitly or implicitly, but once accepted by all parties involved in the discourse, the 
question or set of questions becomes the likely topic of discourse. The relevance of further 
comments is then based on how well they address the current QUD. For example, the statement 
“I am hungry” would narrow a conversation down to several possible QUDs, such as “What do 
you want to eat?” or “Why are you hungry?” Statements that address these implicit QUDs, such 
as “Let’s go to a restaurant,” would be easily integrated into the discourse representation, but a 
statement that departs from the likely QUDs, such as “Let’s book a flight,” would require the 
comprehender to find an alternative QUD that is being answered. From this perspective, 
processing a negation is more difficult when it is unlicensed than when it is licensed, because it 
does not address a current QUD.  
These differences in difficulty should consequently lead to differences in activation for 
negated concepts in licensing and non-licensing contexts. More difficulty with unlicensed 
negation means more time spent processing. Because processing a relevant presupposition (or 
QUD) necessarily includes the concept being negated, it should increase the concept’s activation 
such that it is no less active than it if had been non-negated, or perhaps even more active (Autry 
& Levine, 2012), depending on the amount of additional processing required. This effect is 
similar to that described in the ironic processing literature, where the activation of a concept has 
been shown to increase when people are instructed not to think about it (Wegner & Erber, 1992; 
Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987).  
 The prediction that unlicensed negation results in equal activation of a negated concept is 
supported by the results of Autry and Levine (in press), in which the activation level of 
unlicensed negated concepts was measured while systematically varying the delay between the 
10 
  
end of a sentence containing negation and a probe recognition task (see Table 1). Subjects first 
read a negation sentence that negated one of two direct objects and then read a second sentence 
which was presented word by word at a fixed pace so that the probe words could appear at 
varying delays following the negation sentence: before the first word of the second sentence, 
after the second word of the second sentence, or after the third word of the second sentence. 
When the probe task occurred immediately after the negation sentence, a negation effect 
occurred such that subjects responded faster to the concept when it was non-negated than when it 
was negated. However, when the probe task occurred two or three words into the second 
sentence, the negation effect was no longer present. Furthermore, subjects responded more 
quickly to negated concepts as the delay between the negation sentence and the probe task 
increased, suggesting that the concepts were gradually increasing in activation as time went on. 
These results suggest that activation of negated concepts is initially reduced in non-licensing 
contexts; however, the presupposition processing that occurs for unlicensed negation then 
reactivates the negated concepts such that they are no less active than if they had been non-
negated.  
This evidence for a short-lived reduction in activation of negation concepts is inconsistent 
with the previously discussed studies which demonstrated a relatively long-term reduction in 
activation. Autry and Levine (in press) found that the negation effect was gone as early as 500 
ms after the negation sentence, whereas Kaup (2001) found a negation effect 2.5 seconds after 
the negation sentence, and Cook et al. (2005) found a negation effect after seven intervening 
sentences. The most substantial difference between these experiments is the context in which the 
negation sentences occurred. Autry and Levine (in press) presented the negation sentences in 
isolation, but both Kaup (2001) and Cook et al. (2005) embedded the negation sentences in much 
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larger contexts, ranging from approximately 8 - 15 sentences. Although the negation of the target 
concept was not particularly licensed by the contexts (i.e., the presence of the concept was not 
implied prior to the negation), it is possible that the longer contexts led to a richer discourse 
representation which made the presupposition processing less difficult. Easing the presupposition 
search should reduce the amount of reactivation the negated concept receives, allowing the 
negation effect to persist. This explanation is consistent with the pragmatic-inference hypothesis, 
in that the amount of presupposition processing affects the activation level of the negated 
concept.  
Experimental evidence has also supported the hypothesis that licensing is the factor 
responsible for the different activation levels of negated concepts. Autry and Levine (2012) 
provided subjects with short passages which either licensed a negation via explicit mention or 
not (see Table 2). Subjects wrote a one-sentence continuation of the passage, and these 
continuations were coded for reference to the negated and non-negated concepts in the passage. 
The results showed that in the non-licensing condition, subjects were more likely to write about 
the negated concept than the non-negated concepts, but in the licensing condition, subjects wrote 
about the two concepts about equally often. This suggests that the negated concepts had a higher 
level of activation relative to the non-negated concept when the negation was unlicensed than 
when it was licensed. However, this finding should be interpreted with caution because the 
licensing context involved prior mention of the negated concept. This should have caused the 
concept to have a higher baseline activation in the licensing condition than in the non-licensing 
condition, which complicates the comparison across the two conditions. Furthermore, the 
continuation methodology is an offline measure of production, which may not provide a 
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completely accurate reflection of the activation level of the concepts during (as opposed to after) 
reading.  
Experiment 3 of Autry and Levine (in press) avoided these limitations with an online 
comparison of the effects of licensing. In this experiment, licensing of the single-sentence 
materials from Experiments 1 and 2 (e.g., Every Friday, Tina prepared a lecture but not an 
activity for her students) was manipulated by preceding them with a context sentence that 
provided a reason why the negated entity was not (cf. Moxey & Sanford, 1986) created, 
obtained, etc. (e.g., When she had time, Tina liked to give her students something fun to do) or no 
context at all. Following a sentence which did not provide a reason why the negated entity was 
mentioned, the negated entity was re-mentioned (e.g., Preparing an activity for her students …) 
and reading time was measured on the part of the sentence that included the second mention (see 
Table 3 for a full sample passage). Consistent with Autry and Levine (2012), a negation effect 
emerged in the licensing condition, but not in the non-licensing condition, further supporting the 
hypothesis that licensing is the factor responsible for the variable activation of negated concepts.  
To summarize, negation provides a unique situation for investigating the construction of 
situation models. The negated concept must exist within the representation while preserving the 
information provided by the negation indicating absence or falseness, and it is therefore unclear 
how active the concept would be in the situation model. The existing research on the activation 
level of negated concepts has produced contradictory findings, supporting both the reduced and 
equal activation views; however, the pragmatic-inference hypothesis predicts that context may 
account for the variation in activation levels that has been observed such that negation should 
reduce a concept’s activation only when the negation is licensed. 
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 The purpose of the present experiments was to directly test the predictions of the 
pragmatic-inference hypothesis by comparing the activation levels of negated concepts in 
licensing and non-licensing contexts, while avoiding the problems associated with Autry and 
Levine's (2012) research. The licensing conditions in the following experiments were designed 
such that the target concept was implied, but not explicitly mentioned (cf. McKoon & Ratcliff, 
1989a). For example, the target concept apple was implied by the use of the phrase traditional 
American pie. By not explicitly mentioning the target concept in the licensing condition, the 
concept’s activation level was able to be measured by a probe task without being influenced by 
prior mention of the concept. In Experiment 1, subjects completed a lexical decision task 
following two-sentence passages to determine whether the activation of the concepts differed 
between the licensing and non-licensing contexts. It was essential that the licensing context led 
to a higher level of activation of the target concept than the non-licensing context in order for the 
context manipulation to be useful in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, a third sentence (i.e., the 
target sentence) was added to each passage that negated the target concept or not. The lexical 
decision task occurred both before and after the target sentence to measure how licensing 
modifies the effect of negation on a concept’s activation level, and reading time was measured 
on the target sentence. It was expected that reaction times to the pre-target sentence probe would 
replicate the results of Experiment 1. More importantly, in the licensing condition, reaction times 
following the target sentence were expected to be slower when the target concept was negated 
compared to when it was non-negated. However, in the non-licensing condition, reaction times 
were expected to be no different when the target concept was negated compared to when it was 
non-negated. In addition, target sentence reading times were expected to be longer in the non-
14 
  
licensing condition than in the licensing condition due to the increased processing predicted for 
unlicensed negation. 
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 was designed to measure the activation level of unmentioned target 
concepts in licensing and non-licensing contexts and to verify that the licensing contexts to be 
used in Experiment 2 lead to the target being reliably inferred. That readers will do this has been 
shown by McKoon and Ratcliff (1989a), who demonstrated that readers reliably infer highly-
typical category exemplars when there is a strong semantic association between the exemplar 
and the text (e.g., orange when breakfast juice is mentioned). Subjects in the current experiment 
read two-sentence passages (see Table 4) in which a target concept (e.g., apples) was either 
implied or not and then completed a lexical decision task to measure the activation level of the 
target concept. It was expected that subjects would show evidence of greater activation for the 
target concept when it was implied by the context than when it was not. This finding would 
suggest that the licensing contexts caused subjects to infer the concept to a greater degree than 
the non-licensing contexts. 
Method 
Subjects. Sixty-five students enrolled in a general psychology course at the University of 
Arkansas participated in the experiment to partially fulfill a research requirement and all were 
native-English speakers. 
Materials and design. Subjects read 60 two-sentence passages (24 experimental and 36 
fillers; see Table 3 for a sample passage and Appendix A for a full list of experimental passages). 
Each experimental passage was two sentence in length and occurred in one of two conditions: 
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licensing or non-licensing. In the licensing condition, the first sentence strongly implied4 the 
target concept (e.g., apples) without explicitly mentioning it. In the non-licensing condition, the 
context sentence very weakly implied the target concept, if at all. Although the non-licensing 
context was designed not to imply the target concept, it is likely that at least some amount of 
activation spread from cake to other foods such as apples, in the same way that cake might 
activate related concepts like candles, birthday parties, and ice cream. Therefore, the claim 
being made is that the target concept is more strongly implied in the licensing condition than in 
the non-licensing condition. The second sentence ended with a categorical label which names the 
target concept's taxonomic category (e.g., fruit) and was the same across conditions. The filler 
passages were similar in form to the experimental passages with various modifications to mask 
the experimental manipulation. Subjects saw half of the experimental passages in each of the 
licensing conditions along with all filler sentences. Two counterbalanced lists were created such 
that half of the experimental passages in each list were of each licensing condition, to allow the 
target concepts to serve as their own control when comparing activation following licensing and 
non-licensing contexts.  
 Each passage was followed by a lexical decision task in which subjects were shown a 
string of letters and indicated whether the string was a real word or not. For the experimental 
passages, the letter string for the task was always be the target concept (e.g., apples), which 
required a “yes” response; therefore, a majority of the filler passages included non-word letter 
                                                          
4 A norming test was conducted to determine the degree to which the contexts implied the target 
concepts. Thirty-three subjects were recruited via Mechanical Turk and were asked to list the top 
three concepts that came to mind when presented with questions containing the critical phrases 
of the experimenter-generated licensing contexts (e.g., What fruit is used in a traditional 
American pie?). Only contexts which resulted in more than 90% of subjects responding with the 
target concept as their first answer were included in the experiment. Furthermore, the non-target 
concept was selected based on the criteria that no subjects listed it among their top three answers.  
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strings (e.g., agglim) requiring a “no” response such that there were an equal number of “yes” 
and “no” responses expected across all 60 passages. In addition, each passage had a 
corresponding comprehension question (e.g., Did Cecilia bake an apple pie?) with an equal 
number of “yes” and “no” responses across all 60 passages.  
Procedure. Before beginning the main experiment, subjects completed three practice 
tasks. The first practice task familiarized subjects with the yes/no response keys. The word 
“YES” or “NO” appeared in the center of a computer monitor and subjects responded using the 
left and right arrow keys on a standard keyboard, labeled “Y” and “N” for “yes” and “no,” 
respectively. If subjects responded correctly, the word “CORRECT” appeared in the center of 
the screen for 500 ms before initiating the next trial, but if the subjects responded incorrectly, the 
word “INCORRECT” appeared in the center of the screen for 4000 ms before initiating the next 
trial to encourage accurate responding. The same feedback method was used for each of the three 
practice tasks. The second practice task familiarized subjects with the comprehension task in the 
main experiment. Subjects read two sentences presented one at a time followed by a yes/no 
question about the sentences and responded using the yes/no response keys. The third practice 
task familiarized subjects with the lexical decision task in the main experiment. A string of 
capital letters (4-9 characters in length) appeared in the center of the screen and subjects were 
instructed to indicate whether the letter string was a word in the English language or not using 
the yes/no response keys. After completing the three practice tasks, subjects began the main 
experiment, which did not include feedback about response accuracy.  
 At the beginning of each trial in the main experiment, a fixation cross appeared left-
justified 15% of the way from the left and halfway down the screen. Pressing the spacebar 
presented the first context sentence such that the first word appeared in the same location 
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previously occupied by the fixation cross. Pressing the spacebar again removed the first context 
sentence from the screen and replaced it with the second context sentence. Pressing the spacebar 
again removed the second context sentence from the screen and advanced the subjects to the 
lexical decision task. A string of capital letters (4-9 characters in length) appeared in the center 
of the screen 500 ms after the subject signaled that they had finished reading the passage. The 
letter string remained on the screen until the subject responded using the yes/no response keys to 
indicate whether the letter string is a word. Pressing one of the response keys removed the letter 
string from the screen and replaced it with the comprehension question. Subjects again used the 
yes/no response keys to respond to the comprehension question, which removed the 
comprehension question from the screen and replaced it with the fixation cross to signal the 
beginning of the next trial. The experiment took less than 30 minutes to complete. 
Results 
Data exclusion and general analytic considerations. The data from 7 subjects were 
excluded from further analysis due to having less than 70% lexical decision accuracy, 
exceptionally fast or slow mean lexical decision times, or exceptionally fast mean reading times. 
Therefore, the reported analyses included 58 subjects and 24 items. For all experiments reported 
in this paper, subject and item condition means were analyzed separately; a subscript of 1 
indicates that subjects were treated as a random variable, whereas a subscript of 2 indicates that 
items were treated as a random variable. For all significance tests, an alpha level of .05 was used 
and all reported effect size measures were based on the subjects analysis. 
Lexical decision reaction times and accuracy. Only correct lexical decisions from 
experimental passages that were greater than 300 and less than 3000 ms were included in the 
analysis. Additionally, for each subject, relative outliers were identified within each condition  
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using the procedure recommended by Tukey (1977). These procedures resulted in the removal of 
11% of the total correct responses. Mean lexical decision times and accuracy are presented in 
Table 5. A paired-samples t-test of the lexical decision response times revealed a marginally 
significant difference between the licensing and non-licensing conditions in the subjects analysis, 
t1(57) = 1.77, p = .08, d = 0.13, but not in the items analysis, t2(23) = 0.41, p = .69, with faster 
responses in the licensing context than in the non-licensing context. Additionally, a paired-
samples t-test of accuracy revealed a non-significant difference between the licensing conditions, 
t1(64) = 1.33, p = .19, t2(23) = 1.74, p = .10, although accuracy was slightly higher in the 
licensing context than in the non-licensing context. 
Discussion  
 The faster lexical decision times in the licensing condition provide preliminary evidence 
that subjects were in fact inferring the target concept more than in the non-licensing condition. 
The 30 ms difference in response times suggests that the licensing context made the target 
concept slightly more active than the non-licensing context, and thus, subjects were able to 
respond to it more quickly. Although the effect was non-significant in this experiment, it seems 
to be reliable given that the same pattern of results appeared in the subset of Experiment 2 that 
replicated this manipulation. Accuracy was essentially at ceiling and therefore no differences 
emerged between licensing conditions. Given that the contexts appeared to be implying the target 
concept (or not) as intended, the paradigm was expanded in Experiment 2 by including a target 
sentence in which the negation of the target concept was manipulated and by manipulating the 
position of the lexical decision task.  
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Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 was designed to directly assess the effect of licensing on the activation 
level of negated concepts. Subjects read the same two-sentence contexts from Experiment 1 with 
an additional third, target sentence appended (e.g., Cecilia bought [peaches but not apples / not 
peaches but apples] for the dessert) that presented the target concept (see Table 6). The target 
sentence always negated one of the two concepts, but manipulated which concept was negated so 
that the target concept appeared either negated or non-negated. Reading time was measured on 
the target sentence to provide an index of processing difficulty, and subjects also completed a 
lexical decision task either before the target sentence to assess the effectiveness of the licensing 
context, providing a replication of Experiment 1, or after the target sentence, to measure the 
effect of the negation on the target concepts’ activation. Therefore, in contrast to Experiment 1 in 
which the target concepts were unmentioned and only licensing was manipulated, Experiment 2 
also measured the activation level of explicitly mentioned target concepts as a function of both 
licensing and negation.  
When the lexical decision task was presented prior to the target sentence, it was expected 
that the target concepts would show evidence of a higher level of activation (i.e., shorter lexical 
decision times) in the licensing context than in the non-licensing context, demonstrating that the 
licensing contexts had implied the target concepts more than the non-licensing contexts; this is 
simply a replication of Experiment 1. When the lexical decision task was presented after the 
target sentence, it was expected that a negation effect (i.e., longer lexical decision times for 
negated concepts than for non-negated concepts; cf. MacDonald & Just, 1989) would emerge in 
the licensing contexts but not in the non-licensing contexts. The negation effect should only 
appear in the licensing contexts because unlicensed negation initiates a search process to locate a 
20 
  
relevant presupposition to deny, a process which occurs to a much lesser extent for licensed 
negation. This increased processing involving the negated concept in non-licensing contexts 
should therefore lead to increased activation of the concept such that it is no less active than 
when it is non-negated. This pattern of results would suggest that the activation level of negated 
concepts depends on the context in which the negation occurs.  
Furthermore, it was expected that when the target concept was negated, subjects would 
show evidence of greater processing on the target sentence (i.e., longer reading times) when the 
negation was unlicensed than when the negation was licensed. This should occur because the 
presupposition search is more difficult when the negation is unlicensed, and should therefore 
lead to longer reading times in the non-licensing contexts than in the licensing contexts where 
the presupposition processing is easier. This pattern of results would verify that there is a 
difference in the amount of presupposition processing that occurs for licensed and unlicensed 
negation, supporting the presupposition processing explanation for the equal activation levels of 
negated and non-negated concepts. In addition, because the negation of the alternative concept 
was always unlicensed5, no processing differences were expected on the target sentence (i.e., 
equal reading times) when the target concept was non-negated.  
Method 
Subjects. Seventy-four students enrolled in a general psychology course at the University 
of Arkansas participated in the experiment to partially fulfill a research requirement and all were 
native-English speakers. None of these subjects participated in Experiment 1. 
                                                          
5 The licensing contexts were designed to license the negation of the target concept only, so the 
negation of the alternative concept is unlicensed in both contexts. 
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Materials and design. Subjects read 60 three-sentence passages modified from 
Experiment 1 (24 experimental and 36 fillers; see Table 5 and Appendix A). As in Experiment 1, 
the first context sentence appeared in either the licensing condition (e.g., For the annual bake 
sale, Cecilia wanted to bake a traditional American pie) or non-licensing condition (e.g., For the 
annual bake sale, Cecilia wanted to bake a delicious tasting cake) and the second sentence was 
identical across conditions (e.g., Before she started cooking, she went to the store to pick up the 
fruit). Each passage was also appended with a target sentence that presented the target concept 
(e.g., apples) and an alternative concept from the same category (e.g., peaches) in one of two 
conditions. In the target negated condition, the target concept was negated and the alternative 
concept was non-negated (e.g., Cecilia bought peaches but not apples). In the target non-negated 
condition, the target concept was non-negated and the alternative concept was negated (e.g., 
Cecilia bought not peaches but apples). The inclusion of the alternative concept was necessary 
because with only one direct object the negation would negate the verb rather than the noun (e.g., 
Cecilia did not buy apples) or would require an unnatural sentence structure (e.g., Cecilia bought 
not apples). The alternative concept allowed the negation operator (i.e., not) to appear more 
naturally with the direct object, consistent with previous research6. In either condition, negation 
always occurred in the experimental target sentences and the target concept was always the 
second direct object.  
 The filler passages were similar in form to the experimental passages with various 
modifications to mask the experimental manipulation. Because the target sentence of the 
experimental passages negated the implied target concept half the time, most of the filler 
passages presented implied concepts without negation. Additionally, the number of concepts and 
                                                          
6 However, I acknowledge that the “not X but Y” structure is still not entirely natural. 
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presence of negation was varied (non-systematically) in the filler target sentences to avoid 
drawing too much attention to the target sentences.  
 Each passage also included a lexical decision task. For the experimental passages, the 
letter string for the task was always the target concept (e.g., APPLES), which required a “yes” 
response; therefore, a majority of the filler passages included non-word letter strings (e.g., 
AGGLIM) requiring a “no” response such that there were an equal number of “yes” and “no” 
responses expected across all 60 passages. In addition, the lexical decision task occurred either 
before the target sentence or after the target sentence, manipulated between subjects. 
Each passage also had a corresponding comprehension question. For experimental 
passages, the comprehension questions measured whether subjects correctly comprehended the 
violated expectation. For filler passages, the comprehension questions were about other aspects 
of the sentences. Across all 60 passages, there were an equal number of “yes” and “no” 
responses.  
 Subjects saw the experimental passages in one of four conditions, along with all filler 
sentences. Eight lists of experimental passages were created to fully counterbalance the 
licensing, probe position, and negation variables within subjects. As in Experiment 1, this 
allowed the target concepts to serve as their own control in the comparison of negated vs. non-
negated concepts in the licensing and non-licensing conditions for both pre-negation and post-
negation trials. The manipulation of the factors of theoretical interest in the experiment resulted 
in a design that was 2 (context: licensing, non-licensing) × 2 (negation: negated, non-negated) × 
2 (probe position: pre-target sentence, post-target sentence), with the latter being manipulated 
between subjects. 
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Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1. Subjects 
completed the same set of three practice sessions and used the spacebar to advance from 
sentence to sentence. A third, target sentence was appended to each of the passages used in 
Experiment 1. For subjects in the pre-target sentence condition, the lexical decision task was 
presented between the second context sentence and the target sentence. After subjects responded 
to the probe word, the target sentence was presented, followed by a comprehension question. For 
subjects in the post-target sentence condition, the lexical decision task was presented after the 
third sentence. After the subjects responded to the probe word, a comprehension question was 
presented. The experiment took less than 40 minutes to complete. 
Results 
Data exclusion and analytic considerations. Data from six subjects were excluded from 
analysis for having mean reading times less than 50 ms per character, from five subjects for 
having particularly fast or slow probe reaction times, and from two subjects for having less than 
70% comprehension accuracy, resulting in the exclusion of 13 total subjects. Therefore, the 
reported analyses included 61 subjects and 24 items. The negation variable was only relevant for 
lexical decisions that occurred after the target sentence due to the manipulation of negation 
occurring in the target sentence; therefore separate lexical decision analyses were conducted for 
the pre-target sentence and post-target sentence trials. Additionally, trials in which the lexical 
decision task occurred before the target sentence were excluded from the reading time analysis 
because in these trials the target concept was presented before it was read in the target sentence, 
thus affecting target sentence reading times in a theoretically uninteresting way (see Appendix B 
for an analysis of these excluded trials).  
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 Pre-target sentence lexical decision reaction times and accuracy. Data were cleaned 
exactly as in Experiment 1, resulting in the removal of 7.6% of the total data. Mean lexical 
decision time and accuracy are presented in Table 7. Although responses were faster in the 
licensing condition compared to the non-licensing condition as in Experiment 1, a paired-
samples t-test of the lexical decision response times revealed a non-significant effect of context, 
t1(27) = 1.32, p = .20, t2(23) = 1.06, p = .30. Additionally, a paired-samples t-test of accuracy also 
revealed a non-significant effect of context, t1(27) = 1.44, p = .16, t2(23) = 1.00, p = .33. 
Because the difference in concept activation between the two licensing conditions is 
critical for the target sentence reading time and post-target sentence lexical decision time 
analyses, the pre-target sentence lexical decision times from Experiments 1 and 2 were analyzed 
together. Mean lexical decision times and accuracy for the combined analyses are presented in 
Table 8. A paired-samples t-test of the lexical decision response times revealed a significant 
effect of context, t1(85) = 2.58, p = .01, t2(23) = 2.48, p = .02, d = 0.17, with subjects responding 
faster in the licensing condition than in the non-licensing condition. This finding suggests that 
subjects were inferring the target concept more in the licensing condition than in the non-
licensing condition. However, because accuracy was nearly perfect in both conditions, the 
paired-samples t-test of accuracy was still non-significant, t1(85) = 1.02, p = .31, t2(23) = 1.23, p 
= .23. 
Post-target sentence lexical decision reaction times and accuracy. Only correct lexical 
decisions from experimental passages that were greater than 300 and less than 3000 ms were 
included in the analysis. Additionally, for each subject, relative outliers were identified within 
each condition using Tukey’s procedure. This resulted in the removal of 8.7% of the total data. 
Mean lexical decision time and accuracy are presented in Table 9. 
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In general, accuracy was nearly perfect in all conditions, and subjects responded to the 
probe words faster when the target concept had been non-negated than when it had been negated. 
However, the negation effect was reduced from 98 ms in the non-licensing contexts to only 43 
ms in the licensing contexts. A 2 (context: licensing, non-licensing) x 2 (negation: negated, non-
negated) repeated measures ANOVA of the lexical decision response times revealed a non-
significant interaction between licensing and negation, F1(1, 31) = 1.52, p = .23, F2(1, 23) = 2.26, 
p = .15. However, there was a significant main effect of negation in both analyses, F1(1, 31) = 
5.82, p = .02 , 𝜂𝑝
2 = .16, F2(1, 23) = 8.99, p = .006, with faster reaction times when the target was 
non-negated than when it was negated. There was also a significant main effect of licensing in 
the subject analysis, F1(1, 31) = 6.66 , p = .02, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .18, with faster reaction times in the 
licensing context than in the non-licensing context,  but this effect was not significant the items 
analysis, F2(1, 23) =2.43 , p = .13.  
Paired-samples t-tests revealed that licensing did not have a significant effect on the non-
negated concepts, t1(31) = 0.46, p = .646, t2(23) = 0.20, p = .840; however, subjects did respond 
significantly faster to negated concepts in the licensing condition than in the non-licensing 
condition in the subjects analysis, t1(31) = 2.11, p = .043, d = 0.23, but not in the items analysis, 
t2(23) = 1.86, p = .076. This finding suggests that licensing only has an influence on the 
activation of negated concepts, and that the target concepts were more active when the negation 
was licensed than when it was unlicensed, which is the opposite of what was predicted. 
Furthermore, subjects responded significantly slower to negated concepts than to non-negated 
concepts in the non-licensing condition, t1(31) = 2.59, p = .015, t2(23) = 2.97, p = .007, d = 0.38, 
but not in the licensing condition, t1(31) = 1.21, p = .24, t2(23) = 1.44, p = .16. This finding is 
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again opposite of what was predicted. Additionally, a 2 (licensing) x 2 (negation) repeated 
measures ANOVA of accuracy revealed no significant effects (all Fs < 1.83, all ps > .18).  
Target sentence reading times. Only reading times that were greater than 500 ms and 
less than 7000 ms were included in the analysis. Additionally, for each subject, relative outliers 
were identified within each condition using Tukey’s procedure. This resulted in the removal of 
10.7% of the total data. Mean target sentence reading times are presented in Table 10. 
In general, subjects read the target sentence faster when the target concept was negated 
than when it was non-negated and slightly faster in the non-licensing context than in the 
licensing context. A 2 (context: licensing, non-licensing) x 2 (negation: negated, non-negated) 
repeated measures ANOVA of reading time revealed a significant main effect of negation, F1(1, 
32) = 23.65, p < .001, F2(1, 23) = 17.99, p < .001, with faster reading times when the target 
concept was negated than when it was non-negated. However, the main effect of licensing was 
not significant, F1(1, 32) = 0.76, p = .391, F2(1, 23) = 1.13, p = .298, nor was the interaction 
between licensing and negation, F1(1, 32) = 0.06, p = .806, F2(1, 23) = 0.36, p = .557. 
Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests revealed significant differences between the negated and 
non-negated conditions in the non-licensing condition, t1(32) = 3.89, p < .001, t2(23) = 3.27, p = 
.003, as well as in the licensing condition, t1(32) = 3.96, p < .001, t2(23) = 3.94, p = .001. 
However, there were not significant differences between the licensing conditions in the non-
negated condition, t1(32) = 0.86, p = .395, t2(23) = 1.18, p = .251, nor in the negated condition, 
t1(32) = 0.59, p = .558, t2(23) = 0.41, p = .683. 
Discussion 
 In general, the results did not support the hypotheses. The means of the pre-target-
sentence lexical decision analysis were consistent with Experiment 1, suggesting that subjects 
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were again inferring the target concept in the licensing condition which resulted in a higher level 
of activation for the target concept relative to the non-licensing condition and therefore faster 
responding. The post-target-sentence lexical decision times were counter to predictions: subjects 
responded to negated target concepts faster in the licensing condition than in the non-licensing 
condition. It was predicted that the non-licensing condition would initiate a presupposition 
search that would increase the activation level of the target concept; however, the target concept 
remained less active even when probed after the target sentence containing the negation.  
 Furthermore, it was predicted that when the target concept was negated, target sentence 
reading times would be greater in the non-licensing condition than in the licensing condition due 
to the construction of a relevant presupposition. Although the difference was non-significant, 
reading times on the target sentence were faster in the non-licensing condition than in the 
licensing condition, which is again opposite of what was predicted.  
General Discussion 
The purpose of the present experiments was to determine whether the inconsistent effects 
of negation on the activation level of concepts found in previous studies could be explained by 
the varying degree of presupposition processing that occurs for licensed and unlicensed negation. 
Because unlicensed negation does not clearly deny a particular presupposition, it was expected to 
require additional presupposition processing relative to licensed negation. This additional 
processing should then increase the activation of negated concepts, making them no less active 
than non-negated concepts. Such a finding would demonstrate that the activation level of negated 
concepts depends on whether they are properly licensed.  
Despite evidence from both experiments that the licensing contexts did imply the target 
concepts more than the non-licensing contexts, Experiment 2 failed to find the predicted effect of 
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unlicensed negation. It was expected that the negated target concepts would be more active in the 
non-licensing context than in the licensing context due to the additional processing predicted by 
the pragmatic-inference hypothesis (Levine & Hagaman, 2008); however, this hypothesis was 
not supported.  
 Given that the predicted licensing effect was expected to occur because of additional 
activation resulting from presupposition processing only in the non-licensing context, there are 
several plausible explanations for the present results: (1) subjects engaged in presupposition 
processing equally in both the licensing and non-licensing contexts; (2) subjects engaged in a 
greater amount of presupposition processing in the non-licensing contexts, but it did not affect 
the activation level of the target concept; or (3) subjects did not engage in presupposition 
processing at all.  
The first explanation, that presupposition processing occurs equally for licensed and 
unlicensed negation, is inconsistent with the pragmatic-inference hypothesis, which assumes that 
the amount of presupposition processing necessary to comprehend a statement is greater for 
unlicensed negation than for licensed negation. It is assumed that the target sentence (e.g., 
Cecilia bought peaches but not apples for the dessert) is easier to integrate into the discourse 
representation when the negation of the target concept is motivated by the expectation for the 
concept that arises from the licensing context (e.g., For the annual bake sale, Cecilia wanted to 
bake a traditional American pie. Before she started cooking, she went to the store to pick up the 
fruit.) compared to the non-licensing context (e.g., For the annual bake sale, Cecilia wanted to 
bake a delicious tasting cake. Before she started cooking, she went to the store to pick up the 
fruit.), in which there is a much weaker expectation for the target concept. It is further assumed 
that this difference in difficulty is the result of differences in the amount of presupposition 
29 
  
processing necessary to understand why the negation has been used. If, however, the amount of 
presupposition processing does not differ based on licensing, then any changes in activation 
would be constant and the pattern of activation seen after the negation would be expected to be 
the same as before negation (i.e., licensed concepts would be more active than unlicensed 
concepts), which is consistent with the present results.  
If it is correct that subjects engaged in presupposition processing equally in both the 
licensing and non-licensing contexts, then there are two further possibilities to consider. First, it 
may be that a set amount of presupposition processing occurs regardless of how difficult it is to 
construct the presupposition (i.e., presupposition processing is so quick and efficient that the 
increased difficulty is irrelevant). So, although it is easier to integrate the negation of the target 
concept in the licensing context when the concept is expected, it may be only marginally more 
difficult in the non-licensing context to make the assumption that the target concept was 
expected and to integrate the negation accordingly. Second, it may be that the difference between 
the licensing contexts in the present materials was simply not large enough to cause a measurable 
increase in the activation level of the unlicensed concepts. Although it may have been more 
difficult to construct a relevant presupposition in the non-licensing contexts than in the licensing 
contexts, the difference may have been negligible. This leaves open the possibility that the 
predicted licensing effect could be found using a different set of materials in which a relevant 
presupposition is very difficult to construct in the non-licensing context.  
The second explanation, that more presupposition processing occurs for unlicensed 
negation but does not affect activation, is also inconsistent with the pragmatic-inference 
hypothesis. Although this explanation and the pragmatic-inference hypothesis both assume that a 
greater amount of presupposition processing is necessary to comprehend unlicensed negation, the 
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lack of the predicted effect on the activation of the target concept is incompatible with the 
pragmatic-inference hypothesis which assumes that this greater processing should lead to an 
increase in activation for the negated concept. In contrast, this explanation assumes that 
increased presupposition processing has no effect on the negated concept’s activation level. 
However, this explanation is rather unlikely given the well-established notion that processing 
increases the activation of related concepts, even when that processing is intended to be 
suppressive (Wegner & Erber, 1992). Therefore, if presupposition processing is in fact occurring, 
it would be surprising theoretically to find that it does not affect the activation level of concepts 
central to that processing.  
The third explanation, that presupposition processing was not occurring, is the most 
congruent with the pragmatic-inference hypothesis. It is possible that upon reading the target 
sentence (e.g., Cecilia bought peaches but not apples for the dessert), subjects did not attempt to 
fully integrate the negation into the discourse representation. Understanding why the negation 
was used should be more difficult in the non-licensing context when there was no expectation of 
the negated concept; however, this difficulty is irrelevant if the subjects were not attempting to 
integrate the negation at all. Although subjects may not have been processing the presupposition 
that motivated the negation in the present study, this does not necessarily mean that the predicted 
processing would never occur. Instead, it is possible that the subjects were simply under-
motivated and did not expend the effort necessary to fully comprehend the passages. 
The idea that subjects were not making an inference about why the negation occurred is 
consistent with research demonstrating that some inferential processing is limited or optional. 
For example, elaborative inferences are not necessary to maintain coherence, so the likelihood of 
a reader spending the time and effort to draw the inference decreases as the difficulty of doing so 
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increases (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1989b, 1992). There is also evidence that readers do not always 
resolve anaphors, particularly when identifying the antecedent is difficult and not essential for 
maintaining coherence (Klin, Guzmán, Weingartner, & Ralano, 2006; Klin, Weingartner, 
Guzmán, & Levine, 2004; Levine, Guzmán, & Klin, 2000). These findings support the 
possibility that subjects in the present experiments chose not to understand why the unlicensed 
negation was occurring. If this is the case, then the present findings do not contradict the 
pragmatic-inference hypothesis because the effect of presupposition processing on the activation 
of negated concepts cannot be measured in the absence of any presupposition processing.  
Given that the second explanation is theoretically unfounded, future research should 
attempt to distinguish between the first and third explanations by testing their predictions. A set 
of materials that make the presupposition very difficult to construct is necessary to test whether 
additional presupposition processing occurs for unlicensed negation relative to licensed negation. 
Furthermore, a more engaging procedure (e.g., more interesting passages, more in-depth 
comprehension questions, or special instructions) is necessary to test the prediction that subjects 
were opting not to construct the missing presupposition in the non-licensing contexts.  
Finally, given that the predicted effects of licensing were not found, it is worth discussing 
whether the present materials did, in fact, license the negation in the target sentences. Licensing 
of negation has occurred in a variety of ways in the literature on negation comprehension. One 
method of licensing negation has been to introduce into a discourse two alternatives that are 
incompatible and later negating one (Glenberg et al., 1999; Johnson-Laird & Tridgell, 1972; Lea 
& Mulligan, 2002). For example, Glenberg et al. provided subjects with short passages that 
mentioned two alternatives that were under consideration (e.g., She wasn't sure if a darkly 
colored couch would look the best or a lighter color.) prior to a sentence that negated one of the 
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alternatives (e.g., The couch wasn't black.), which led to substantially easier processing than if 
the prior context did not mention the alternatives. Another method of licensing negation has been 
to negate what is expected, or the usual state of affairs (Wason, 1961). Wason found evidence 
that the exceptionality of a state of affairs made its negative easier to process. For example, if the 
train one takes every morning is usually late, the exceptional event of the train being on time is 
better described as the train was not late than if the train is usually on time. Both of these 
methods of licensing make the negations more informative (cf. Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). 
The licensing in the present experiments was modeled after the latter method. In the 
licensing contexts, the negation of the target concept was preceded by information implying the 
presence of the concept, such that subjects should be able to understand that the purpose of the 
negation was to deny this expectation. However, this technique was complicated by the fact that 
the present materials negated nouns rather than properties. Whereas properties often have readily 
available alternatives (e.g., an opposite, as in tidy and messy; cf. Mayo et al., 2004), the same is 
generally not true for nouns (e.g., apple does not have a clear opposite). This difference affects 
how informative the negation is. If someone says that their room is not tidy, it can be understood 
that the room is messy; however, if someone says that they have no apples, it remains unclear 
what they actually have, if anything at all. So, although the present materials implied the 
presence of the target concept in the licensing condition, the lack of a clear alternative leads the 
negation to remain underinformative. An alternative concept was provided in the target sentences 
(e.g., Cecilia bought peaches but not apples for the dessert), but the same amount of information 
would have been provided in the absence of the negation (e.g., Cecilia bought peaches for the 
dessert); therefore, the negation did not add any additional information to the sentence.  
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It is possible that the underinformative nature of negating concepts, rather than 
properties, made it such that presupposition processing was not simplified in the licensing 
condition as expected. This is similar to the first explanation provided earlier, that the licensing 
and non-licensing contexts lead to equal amounts of presupposition processing; however, here 
the assumption is being made that the licensing contexts did not actually license the negation. It 
may be that although the target concepts were implied more in the licensing contexts, this did not 
license the negation of the target concepts as intended. Future research should address this issue 
by conducting a similar manipulation with properties instead of nouns. 
Conclusion 
 Although the hypotheses regarding the activation of negated concepts were not 
supported, it remains a possibility that an alternative set of materials could produce the predicted 
effect of licensing. If the unlicensed negation can be made particularly incongruous, or if 
subjects can be made to fully comprehend the passages, the predictions of the pragmatic-
inference hypothesis may yet be supported. It is also possible, however, that the pragmatic-
inference hypothesis is incorrect, and that the availability of a presupposition to deny does not 
have an effect on the activation level of negated concepts. The validity of the pragmatic-
inference hypothesis and the licensing explanation for the varying activation levels of negated 
concepts therefore remain open questions in need of further research.   
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Table 1. Sample Materials from Autry and Levine (in press) 
Noun1 
Negated 
Every Friday, Tina prepared not a lecture but 
only an activity for her students. Usually 
during lunchtime, she would plan things out. 
Noun2 
Negated 
Every Friday, Tina prepared a lecture but not 
an activity for her students. Usually during 
lunchtime, she would plan things out. 
Noun1 
Probe 
LECTURE 
Noun2 
Probe 
ACTIVITY 
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Table 2. Sample materials from Autry & Levine (2012) 
Licensing  Context Justin regularly ate an apple after his morning 
exercise. He jogged and stopped at a store 
afterward. 
Non-licensing 
Context 
Justin got up early to exercise. He jogged and 
stopped at a store afterward. 
Target Sentences  
   AND Justin bought a mango and an apple. 
   NOT Justin bought a mango but not an apple. 
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Table 3. Sample experimental passage from Experiment 3. 
Licensed Negation 
   When she had time, Tina liked to give / her students something fun to do. Every Friday Tina  
   prepared / a lecture but not an activity for her students. She enjoyed / being a teacher.    
   Preparing an activity for her students / would have to wait till she had more time. 
Licensed No Negation 
   When she had time, Tina liked to give / her students something fun to do. Every Friday Tina  
   prepared / a lecture and an activity for her students. She enjoyed / being a teacher. Preparing  
   an activity for her students / made them much happier. 
Unlicensed Negation 
   Every Friday Tina prepared / a lecture but not an activity for her students. She enjoyed /  
   being a teacher. Preparing an activity for her students / would have to wait till she had more  
   time. 
Unlicensed No Negation 
   Every Friday Tina prepared / a lecture and an activity for her students. She enjoyed / being a  
   teacher. Preparing an activity for her students / made them much happier. 
Note. The /s indicate the points at which the sentences were split.  
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Table 4. Sample Passages from Experiment 1 
Experimental Passage 
Licensing Context For the annual bake sale, Cecilia wanted to bake a traditional 
American pie. Before she started cooking, she went to the store to 
pick up the fruit. 
  
Non-Licensing 
Context 
For the annual bake sale, Cecilia wanted to bake a delicious 
tasting cake. Before she started cooking, she went to the store to 
pick up the fruit. 
  
Letter String APPLES (YES) 
 
Comprehension Did Cecilia bake an apple pie? (NO) 
 
Filler Passage 
Context His first year in town, Travis went a little overboard for Christmas. 
 When he finished shopping, the store was completely sold out of 
decorations. 
 
Letter String AGGLIM (NO) 
 
Comprehension  Did Travis recently move to town? (YES) 
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Table 5. Experiment 1 mean lexical decision time and 
accuracy with standard error 
 Lexical Decision Time Probe Accuracy 
Non-licensing 808 (29.6) .96 (.015) 
Licensing 778 (28.9) .97 (.012) 
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Table 6. Sample Passages from Experiment 2 
        Experimental Passage 
Licensing Context For the annual bake sale, Cecilia 
wanted to bake a traditional American 
pie. Before she started cooking, she 
went to the store to pick up the fruit. 
Non-Licensing 
Context 
For the annual bake sale, Cecilia 
wanted to bake a delicious tasting 
cake. Before she started cooking, she 
went to the store to pick up the fruit. 
Target Sentence  
   Target Negated Cecilia bought peaches but not apples 
for the dessert. 
   Target Non-
negated 
Cecilia bought not peaches but apples 
for the dessert.  
Letter String APPLES (YES) 
Comprehension Did Cecilia bake an apple pie? (NO) 
 
                                             Filler Passage 
Context His first year in town, Travis went a 
little overboard for Christmas. 
 When he finished shopping, the store 
was completely sold out of decorations. 
Target Sentence Travis hung the most lights in the 
whole neighborhood.  
Letter String AGGLIM (NO) 
Comprehension  Did Travis recently move to town? 
(YES) 
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Table 7. Experiment 2 mean pre-target sentence lexical 
decision time and accuracy with standard error 
 Lexical Decision Time Probe Accuracy 
Non-licensing 881 (44.5) 1.00 (.003) 
Licensing 842 (41.2) 0.99 (.007) 
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Table 8. Combined Experiment 1 and 2 mean pre-target 
sentence lexical decision time and accuracy with standard error 
 Lexical Decision Time Probe Accuracy 
Non-licensing 911 (36.3) 0.97 (.009) 
Licensing 860 (27.5) 0.98 (.006) 
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Table 9. Experiment 2 mean post-target sentence lexical decision time and accuracy 
 Lexical Decision Time Probe Accuracy 
 Non-negated Negated Non-negated Negated 
Non-licensing 825 (34.1) 923 (54.1) .99 (.007) .99 (.007) 
Licensing 815 (41.5) 858 (43.1) 1.00 (.000) .98 (.011) 
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Table 10. Experiment 2 mean target sentence 
reading times with standard error 
 Non-negated Negated 
Non-licensing 3193 (111) 2828 (118) 
Licensing 3298 (120)  2864 (101) 
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Appendix A 
Full Set of Experimental Items 
Passage 1  
Licensing 
Context 
For the annual bake sale, Cecilia wanted to bake a traditional American 
pie. Before she started cooking, she went to the store to pick up the fruit. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
For the annual bake sale, Cecilia wanted to bake a delicious tasting cake. 
Before she started cooking, she went to the store to pick up the fruit. 
  
Target Sentence Cecilia bought (peaches but not apples/not peaches but apples) for the 
dessert. 
  
Probe word APPLES 
  
Comprehension Did Cecilia buy vegetables? (NO) 
  
Passage 2  
Licensing 
Context 
Maria called all of the children together to eat at her son's birthday party. 
She gave each child a plate for their food. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Maria called all of the children together to eat at her son's baseball game. 
She gave each child a plate for their food. 
  
Target Sentence Maria served (pizza but not cake/not pizza but cake) to the children. 
  
Probe word CAKE 
  
Comprehension Did Maria serve adults? (NO) 
  
Passage 3  
Licensing 
Context 
Fancying himself a chef, Carl wanted to cook a huge feast for 
Thanksgiving. He paid special attention to pick the perfect bird. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Fancying himself a chef, Carl wanted to cook a huge feast for his birthday. 
He paid special attention to pick the perfect bird. 
  
Target Sentence Carl served (chicken but not turkey/not chicken but turkey) at the meal. 
  
Probe word TURKEY 
  
Comprehension Did Carl like to cook? (YES) 
  
Passage 4  
Licensing 
Context 
Arnold went to the concession stand to buy something to eat during the 
movie premier. He was so hungry that he had trouble deciding on a snack. 
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Non-licensing 
Context  
Arnold went to the concession stand to buy something to eat during the 
chess tournament. He was so hungry that he had trouble deciding on a 
snack. 
  
Target Sentence Arnold bought (nachos but not popcorn/not nachos but popcorn) to hold 
him until dinner. 
  
Probe word POPCORN 
  
Comprehension Did Arnold go to a concession stand? (YES) 
  
Passage 5  
Licensing 
Context 
With the money he had been saving, Matt bought a ring for his fiancé. He 
asked his mother to help him select the stone. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
With the money he had been saving, Matt bought a ring for his secret 
crush. He asked his mother to help him select the stone. 
  
Target Sentence Matt chose (a ruby but not a diamond/not a ruby but a diamond) for the 
ring. 
  
Probe word DIAMOND 
  
Comprehension Did Matt chose the ring by himself? (NO) 
  
Passage 6  
Licensing 
Context 
Marvin the Magnificent recited a spell as he pulled a surprise out of his 
hat. He had practiced for years to be able to conjure the animal. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Marvin the Magnificent recited a spell as he pulled a surprise out of his 
sleeve. He had practiced for years to be able to conjure the animal. 
  
Target Sentence Marvin revealed (a dove but not a rabbit/not a dove but a rabbit) to the 
astonished crowd. 
  
Probe word RABBIT 
  
Comprehension Was Marvin an amateur? (NO) 
  
Passage 7  
Licensing 
Context 
After graduating from high school, Anna considered moving to California 
to chase after her dream career. When she arrived, the first thing she did 
was look for a job. 
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Non-licensing 
Context  
After graduating from high school, Anna considered moving to California 
to chase after her boyfriend. When she arrived, the first thing she did was 
look for a job. 
  
Target Sentence Anna was hired (as a model but not an actor/not as a model but an actor) 
after only a week of searching. 
  
Probe word ACTOR 
  
Comprehension Did Anna graduate high school? (YES) 
  
Passage 8  
Licensing 
Context 
In the summer, Joe liked to sit outside and observe the constellations. To 
peer into the sky, he only needed one tool. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
In the summer, Joe liked to sit outside and observe the weather. To peer 
into the sky, he only needed one tool. 
  
Target Sentence Joe used (his eyes but not a telescope/not his eyes but a telescope) to view 
the heavens. 
  
Probe word TELESCOPE 
  
Comprehension Did Joe like the outdoors? (YES) 
  
Passage 9  
Licensing 
Context 
The last time she visited the zoo, Carol was allowed to feed the hanging 
animals. She asked an animal trainer to give her the food. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
The last time she visited the zoo, Carol was allowed to feed the colorful 
birds. She asked an animal trainer to give her the food. 
  
Target Sentence Carol fed the animals (carrots but not bananas/not carrots but bananas) for 
their lunch. 
  
Probe word BANANAS 
 
Comprehension Did Carol own the animals? (NO) 
  
Passage 10  
Licensing 
Context 
For her first international assignment, Megan went to Egypt to write about 
the ancient monuments. She was just dying to see the famous tourist 
attractions. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
For her first international assignment, Megan went to Egypt to write about 
mummification. She was just dying to see the famous tourist attractions. 
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Target Sentence Megan visited (the Sphynx but not the pyramids/not the Sphynx but the 
pyramids) on her first day there. 
  
Probe word PYRAMIDS 
  
Comprehension Did Megan visit Rome? (NO) 
  
Passage 11  
Licensing 
Context 
Robert loved to keep his mind sharp with stimulating puzzles. Every 
Sunday, he purchased a copy of the newspaper. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Robert loved to keep his mind sharp with stimulating challenges. Every 
Sunday, he purchased a copy of the newspaper. 
  
Target Sentence Robert would complete (the Sudoku but not the crossword/not the sudoku 
but the crossword) before church. 
  
Probe word CROSSWORD 
  
Comprehension Did Robert buy the newspaper? (YES) 
  
Passage 12  
Licensing 
Context 
Ella's mouth was dry and she needed something to wash down her Oreos. 
She went to the kitchen to get a cold drink. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Ella's mouth was dry and she needed something to wash down her dinner. 
She went to the kitchen to get a cold drink. 
  
Target Sentence Ella poured a glass (of juice but not milk/not of juice but milk) to whet her 
whistle. 
  
Probe word MILK 
  
Comprehension Did Ella go to the kitchen? (NO) 
  
Passage 13  
Licensing 
Context 
Thomas was known as an unbeatable deer hunter. When he went hunting, 
he only trusted the job to one weapon.  
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Thomas was known as an unbeatable elephant hunter. When he went 
hunting, he only trusted the job to one weapon.  
  
Target Sentence Thomas used (a bow but not a rifle/not a bow but a rifle) as he always had. 
  
Probe word RIFLE 
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Comprehension Did Thomas use many different weapons? (NO) 
  
Passage 14  
Licensing 
Context 
Before the long trip, Richard needed to fill up the tank on his car. He got 
to the refilling station and selected the proper fuel. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Before the long trip, Richard needed to fill up the tank on his 18 wheeler. 
He got to the refilling station and selected the proper fuel. 
  
Target Sentence Richard topped off his vehicle (with diesel but not gasoline/not with diesel 
but gasoline) after paying. 
  
Probe word GASOLINE 
  
Comprehension Did Richard drive a motorcycle? (NO) 
  
Passage 15  
Licensing 
Context 
Daniel wanted to buy a new piece of furniture for his living room. He had 
trouble deciding on the right item. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Daniel wanted to buy a new piece of furniture for his office. He had 
trouble deciding on the right item. 
  
Target Sentence Daniel bought (a recliner but not a couch/not a recliner but a couch) in the 
end. 
  
Probe word COUCH  
  
Comprehension Did Daniel want new furniture? (YES) 
  
Passage 16  
Licensing 
Context 
Chris was recently hired to replace a member of a famous heavy metal 
band. He was so excited about the new gig that he bought a brand new 
instrument. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Chris was recently hired to replace a member of a famous orchestra. He 
was so excited about the new gig that he bought a brand new instrument. 
  
Target Sentence Chris became well-known for playing (the bass but not the guitar/not the 
bass but the guitar) in the band. 
  
Probe word GUITAR  
  
Comprehension Did Chris play in a band? (YES) 
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Passage 17  
Licensing 
Context 
Mallory was looking for something to eat during her vacation in Hawaii. 
She asked a local guide where she could find the best local cuisine. 
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Mallory was looking for something to eat during her vacation in Montana. 
She asked a local guide where she could find the best local cuisine. 
  
Target Sentence Mallory ate (a burger but not seafood/not a burger but seafood) at a 
pleasant little restaurant. 
  
Probe word SEAFOOD 
  
Comprehension Did Mallory find the restaurant herself? (NO) 
  
Passage 18  
Licensing 
Context 
On the first day of summer, Rebecca fell and broke her arm. She went to 
see her doctor for treatment.   
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
On the first day of summer, Rebecca fell and bruised her arm. She went to 
see her doctor for treatment.   
  
Target Sentence Rebecca got (a sling but not a cast/not a sling but a cast) for her arm. 
  
Probe word CAST 
  
Comprehension Did Rebecca get in a car accident? (NO) 
  
Passage 19  
Licensing 
Context 
Casey won an award for his 20th year working at the same high school. He 
was glad to receive recognition for his job.   
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Casey won an award for his 20th year working at the same hospital. He 
was glad to receive recognition for his job.   
  
Target Sentence Casey continued to work (as a janitor but not a teacher/not as a janitor but 
a teacher) at the institution for many more years. 
  
Probe word TEACHER 
  
Comprehension Did Casey receive an award? (YES) 
  
Passage 20  
Licensing 
Context 
Tracy couldn't wait to celebrate her 16th birthday. She was most excited 
about opening her big present.   
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Non-licensing 
Context  
Tracy couldn't wait to celebrate her 30th birthday. She was most excited 
about opening her big present.   
  
Target Sentence Tracy got (a dog but not a vehicle/not a dog but a vehicle) from her 
parents. 
  
Probe word VEHICLE 
  
Comprehension Was Tracy celebrating her birthday? (YES) 
  
Passage 21  
Licensing 
Context 
At the buffet, Peter liked to prepare the ultimate ice cream sundae. He was 
very serious about his selection of toppings.   
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
At the buffet, Peter liked to prepare the ultimate plate. He was very serious 
about his selection of toppings. 
  
Target Sentence Peter used (nuts but not hot fudge/not nuts but hot fudge) to top it all off. 
  
Probe word FUDGE  
  
Comprehension Was Peter eating at home? (NO) 
  
Passage 22  
Licensing 
Context 
Every morning, Janice would get ready in the shower. She always made 
sure to use her favorite hair product.  
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Every morning, Janice would get ready in her apartment. She always made 
sure to use her favorite hair product.  
  
Target Sentence Janice put (conditioner but not shampoo/not conditioner but shampoo) in 
her hair. 
  
Probe word SHAMPOO  
  
Comprehension Did Janice shower in the evening? (NO) 
  
Passage 23  
Licensing 
Context 
Steve was very proud to have graduated from the police academy. His first 
day on the job, he was forced to draw his weapon.   
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Steve was very proud to have graduated from the ninja dojo. His first day 
on the job, he was forced to draw his weapon. 
  
Target Sentence Steve used (a baton but not a gun/not a baton but a gun) to defend himself. 
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Probe word GUN 
  
Comprehension Was Steve a novice? (YES) 
  
Passage 24  
Licensing 
Context 
Stephanie wanted to go to a yardsale to buy a large dresser. Because she 
normally rode a bike, she needed to borrow someone's vehicle.  
  
Non-licensing 
Context  
Stephanie wanted to go to a yardsale to buy a lamp. Because she normally 
rode a bike, she needed to borrow someone's vehicle.  
  
Target Sentence Stephanie borrowed (a car but not a truck/not a car but a truck) from her 
neighbor. 
  
Probe word TRUCK 
  
Comprehension Did Stephanie own a bike? (YES) 
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Appendix B 
When the lexical decision task was presented before the target sentence, subjects were 
exposed to the target concept before reading it in the target sentence. This prior exposure likely 
influenced reading times on the target sentence; therefore, these trials were not included in the 
target sentence reading time analysis and were instead analyzed separately and presented below. 
Only reading times that were greater than 500 ms and less than 7000 ms were included in 
the analysis. Additionally, for each subject, relative outliers were identified within each 
condition using Tukey’s procedure. This resulted in the removal of 9.8% of the total data. A 2 
(context: licensing, non-licensing) x 2 (negation, negated, non-negated) repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed no significant differences between conditions. The interaction between 
context and negation was non-significant, F1(1, 27) = 0.16, p = .70, F2(1, 23) = .001, p = .98, as 
were the main effect of context, F1(1, 27) = 0.02, p = .89, F2(1, 23) = 0.20, p = .66, and the main 
effect of negation, F1(1, 27) = 0.19, p = .67, F2(1, 23) = 0.09, p = .77. 
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Appendix C 
MEMORANDUM 
 
TO: Kevin Autry 
 William Levine 
   
FROM: Ro Windwalker 
 IRB Coordinator 
 
RE: New Protocol Approval 
 
IRB Protocol #: 11-09-127 
 
Protocol Title: Representation of Negation in Licensing and Non-Licensing 
Contexts 
 
Review Type:  EXEMPT  EXPEDITED  FULL IRB 
 
Approved Project Period: Start Date: 10/4/2011  Expiration Date:  10/3/2012 
 
Your protocol has been approved by the IRB.  Protocols are approved for a maximum period of 
one year.  If you wish to continue the project past the approved project period (see above), you 
must submit a request, using the form Continuing Review for IRB Approved Projects, prior to the 
expiration date.  This form is available from the IRB Coordinator or on the Research Compliance 
website (http://vpred.uark.edu/210.php).  As a courtesy, you will be sent a reminder two months 
in advance of that date.  However, failure to receive a reminder does not negate your obligation 
to make the request in sufficient time for review and approval.   Federal regulations prohibit 
retroactive approval of continuation. Failure to receive approval to continue the project prior to 
the expiration date will result in Termination of the protocol approval.  The IRB Coordinator can 
give you guidance on submission times. 
This protocol has been approved for 360 participants. If you wish to make any modifications 
in the approved protocol, including enrolling more than this number, you must seek approval 
prior to implementing those changes.   All modifications should be requested in writing (email is 
acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change. 
If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 210 
Administration Building, 5-2208, or irb@uark.edu. 
